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Princeton University
We study preference aggregation under uncertainty when individual and collec-
tive preferences are based on subjective expected utility. A natural procedure for
determining the collective preferences of a group then is to average its members’
beliefs and add up their (0, 1)-normalized utility functions. This procedure extends
the well-known relative utilitarianism to decision making under uncertainty. We
show that it is the only aggregation function that gives tie-breaking rights to agents
who join a group and satisfies an independence condition in the spirit of Arrow’s
independence of irrelevant alternatives as well as four undiscriminating axioms.
A group of policymakers seeks to decide between action plans whose consequences depend on
unknown facts about the world. Their preferences over the alternatives hinge on their beliefs
about the world, such as the probability that an economic intervention is efficacious, and their
tastes for consequences like enhanced labor rights or higher GDP. How should they arrive at a
group preference?
To put this question on formal grounds, we assume that each agent is rational in the sense that
her preferences meet Savage’s (1954) criteria and we shall hold groups to the same standard.
The beauty of Savage’s assumptions is that they allow us to express preferences in an intuitive
way: agents assign probabilities to possible states of the world—expressing their belief—and
utilities to consequences—capturing tastes, so that more preferred acts have higher expected
utility. To tackle the aggregation problem, we consider aggregation functions, which map each
possible configuration of preferences for the members of a group to a preference of the group.
Our approach is thus multi-profile in that it contemplates hypothetical configurations that could
arise rather than a single observed one.
A seemingly sensible way to arrive at the preferences of a group—or, equivalently, its belief
and utility function—is by averaging its members’ beliefs and adding up their utility functions,
each normalized so that the minimal and maximal values agree across agents. We call this
aggregation method belief-averaged relative utilitarianism.
For decision making under risk, that is, when all agents hold the same objective belief, relative
utilitarianism is well-known and has been characterized several times (see Karni, 1998; Dhillon,
1998; Dhillon and Mertens, 1999; Segal, 2000; Börgers and Choo, 2017b). For decision making
under uncertainty, Gilboa et al. (2004) introduced a restricted Pareto condition that is necessary
1
Draft – May 11, 2020
and sufficient for the collective belief and utility function to be linear combinations of the agents’
beliefs and utility functions, but allows the weights to vary across profiles. We combine both
themes, which leads to a characterization of belief-averaged relative utilitarianism. Our axioms
are inspired by those of Dhillon and Mertens and Gilboa et al. and discussed in detail below.
It is instructive to contrast our ex post relative utilitarianism with Sprumont’s (2019) ex ante
relative utilitarianism: the former derives a collective belief and compares acts based on the
sum of the agents’ expected utilities under the collective belief; the latter first calculates the
expected utility of an act for each agent based on their own belief and then compares acts by the
sum of expected utilities. The upshot is that ex post aggregation gives rise to a collective belief
and utility function (and thus Savage-type collective preferences), whereas ex ante aggregation
meets the Pareto principle. Only dictatorships can achieve both as was shown by Mongin
(1995). In subsequent work, Mongin argues that preferences based on different beliefs can lead
to “spurious unanimities” to which the Pareto condition need not apply. This motivates the
restricted Pareto axiom introduced by Gilboa et al. (2004), which ex post relative utilitarianism
does satisfy and is the most we can hope for given our assumptions about collective preferences.
We discuss related literature more extensively in Section 5.
Our two distinguishing axioms are restricted monotonicity (or monotonicity for short) and
independence of redundant acts.
To understand monotonicity, consider the following situation: a group has determined a
collective preference (represented by a belief and a utility function). Say they are indifferent
between two acts f and g. Now an additional agent who prefers f to g joins the group.
Moreover, f induces the same probability distribution over consequences for her belief and the
group belief. That is, for every consequence, she assigns the same probability to f resulting in
this consequence as does the group. Likewise, g induces the same distribution for both beliefs.
Monotonicity demands that the augmented group with the additional agent prefers f to g. In
other words, agents get to break ties when joining a group if their belief does not differ from
the group’s belief in a way that is relevant for the acts in question. To see why the restriction
to conforming beliefs is reasonable, perhaps even desirable, consider two examples:
Example 1. Alice and Bob are planning a weekend activity. They are considering hiking and
playing board games at home. There is uncertainty whether it will rain or not, which creates two
different states of the world: one in which it will rain and one in which it will not rain. After
discussing their beliefs about the weather and their tastes for both activities under different
conditions, they decide that they, as a group, are indifferent. Later they receive a call from
their friend Charlie, who will join them for the activity. Charlie prefers hiking to playing board
games, and so they decide to go hiking.
Since the uncertainty is about the weather and every one of them is unlikely to have access
to more relevant information than the others, it is safe to assume that Charlie shares Alice and
Bob’s belief. (Indeed, it may well be that all three agents have the same belief.) Hence, Charlie
should get to break the tie, so that the group of all three agents prefers hiking to playing board
games.
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rain/win rain/lose no rain/win no rain/lose
{Alice, Bob}
belief 10% 40% 10% 40%
utility from f 0 -1 4 0
Charlie
belief 40% 10% 40% 10%
utility from f 0 -5 1 0
{Alice, Bob, Charlie}
belief 30% 20% 30% 20%
utility from f 0 -6 5 0
Table 1: Exemplary numerical values for Example 2. The columns correspond to the four states
of the world, resulting from the weather (rain or no rain) and the outcome of the match
(win or lose). Each row specifies the belief about states and the utility derived from
going to the football match (f) for the corresponding group of agents in each state. We
assume playing board games (g) yields utility 0 for all groups in all states. Then Alice
and Bob have expected utility 0 for both f and g and are thus indifferent; Charlie’s
expected utility for f is −0.1, so that he prefers g to f . However, the group of all three
agents prefers f to g, since they assign utility 0.3 to f .
Example 2. Later Alice sprains her foot, which makes hiking impossible. Alice and Bob bring
up going to a football match of their favorite team (f) as an alternative to playing board games
(g). Now there is not only uncertainty about the weather but also about whether their team will
win or lose the match. As before, they are indifferent between both options. They call Charlie,
who prefers playing board games over the match. Nevertheless, the three of them decide to go
to the football match.
Now there are four states of the world resulting from two possibilities for the weather and
two for the outcome of the match. We can view playing board games as a constant act, one
which yields the same consequence in all states since it depends neither on the weather nor on
the outcome of the match; but going to the match depends on both factors. In contrast to the
belief about the weather, Charlie may well disagree with Alice and Bob’s belief about the game,
and so monotonicity does not apply. Say Alice and Bob assign a probability of 50% to rain and
of 20% to a win (and both events are independent); Charlie agrees with the probability of rain
but assigns 80% to a win. If Charlie is a football expert, the group may assign a large weight
to his belief and rate a win at 60% (with again 50% for rain). On the other hand, they assign
the same weight to everyone’s utilities. For suitable numerical values (see Table 1), the group
decision in Example 2 can occur.
Our definition of monotonicity requires that the set of agents can vary. We will thus consider
aggregation functions that take as input the preferences of an arbitrary finite set of agents that
may vary in size. When requiring that the preferences of every single-agent group are those
of its sole member (which we call faithfulness), restricted monotonicity implies the restricted
Pareto condition of Gilboa et al. (2004). It prescribes that whenever all agents are indifferent
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between two acts f and g and both induce the same distribution over consequences for every
agent’s belief, then the group is indifferent between f and g. It is necessary and sufficient for
the collective belief and utility function to be linear combinations of the agents’ beliefs and
utility functions. The weights in both these linear combinations can, however, vary arbitrarily
across profiles. Monotonicity implies that the weight of an agent in either linear combination
can only depend on her own preferences as we will see. To also eliminate this dependency, we
need an axiom that connects profiles with different preferences for the same agent.
Typical candidates are independence axioms, which state that the collective preferences over
a set of acts can only depend on the individual preferences over those acts. The most well-
known candidate from this family, Arrow’s independence of irrelevant alternatives (or acts in
our case), demands the above assertion for arbitrary sets of acts. It will lead to an impossibility
result even with only mild additional axioms (see, for example, Kalai and Schmeidler (1977)
for decision making under risk). Dhillon and Mertens (1999) proposed a weaker version called
independence of redundant alternatives. It is the blueprint for our independence of redundant
acts, which requires the above independence for sufficiently large sets of acts. More precisely,
say we have two preference profiles (on the same set of agents) and a set of acts G so that every
agent has the same preferences over acts in G in both profiles and every act is unanimously
indifferent to some act in G in both profiles. Then the collective preferences over acts in G
should be the same in both profiles. The second assumption on G is equivalent to saying that
for both profiles, G has the same image in utility space as the set of all acts. That is, the vector
of expected utilities of every act is equal to the expected utilities of an act in G.
On top of restricted monotonicity and independence of redundant acts, we make four addi-
tional assumptions about the aggregation function: the preferences of any single-agent group
are those of its sole member (faithfulness), no agent can impose her belief on a group (no belief
imposition), the preferences of any group depend continuously on the preferences of its members
(continuity), and relabeling agents does not change the collective preferences (anonymity). We
show that these six conditions characterize belief-averaged relative utilitarianism.
The proof is modular and yields two intermediary results that are interesting in their own
right. First, dropping anonymity, we characterize the class of aggregation functions that assign
two positive (and possibly different) weights to every agent, one for her belief and one for
her utility function, and then derive the collective preferences of any group from the weighted
linear combinations of the beliefs and utility functions of its members. Second, additionally
dropping independence of redundant acts allows the weights of an agent to depend on her own
preferences. More precisely, the weights of every agent can now be arbitrary continuous and
positive functions of her preferences. However, the weights of an agent cannot depend on the
other agents’ preferences. We give details about the necessity of the axioms for all three results
in Section 4.
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1. Preferences and Aggregation Functions
Let Ω be a set of states of the world and Σ be a sigma-algebra over Ω. We refer to elements of
Σ as events. A probability measure π on (Ω,Σ) is non-atomic if for every A ∈ Σ with π(A) > 0,
there is B ⊂ A with 0 < π(B) < π(A). We denote by Π the set of all non-atomic and countably
additive probability measures. Let X be a set of consequences endowed with a sigma-algebra.
An act is a measurable function f : Ω→ X that maps states to consequences.
We assume that preferences over acts are the result of maximizing expected utility according
to a belief π ∈ Π and a utility function u : X → R that is measurable and bounded. We say
that π and u represent the preference relation < ⊂ F ×F and conversely that π and u are the
belief and the utility function associated with < if
f < g if and only if
∫
Ω
(u ◦ f)dπ ≥
∫
Ω
(u ◦ g)dπ, (⋆)
for all acts f, g. The strict and symmetric part of < are ≻ and ∼, respectively. We denote by
R¯ the set of all preference relations that can be represented by expected utility maximization;
R consists of R¯ minus complete indifference, which corresponds to a constant utility function
and an arbitrary belief.
All preference relations in R give rise to a unique belief. Utility functions are only unique up
to positive affine transformations. To establish a one-to-one correspondence between preference
relations and utility functions, let U be the set of all non-constant utility functions normalized
to the unit interval, that is, inf{u(x) : x ∈ X} = 0 and sup{u(x) : x ∈ X} = 1; U¯ consists of U
plus the utility function that is constant at 0. When π ∈ Π and u ∈ U¯ represent <, we write
E<(f) =
∫
Ω(u ◦ f)dπ for the expected utility of f under π and u.
We postulate an infinite set of potential agents N. A group I consists of a non-empty and
finite subset of agents; the collection of all groups is I. Symbols in bold face refer to tuples
indexed by a set of agents. Every agent has a preference relation <i ∈ R. (Notice that no
agent may be completely indifferent.) A preference profile < ∈ RI for agents in I specifies the
preferences of each agent in I. For i ∈ N− I and <i ∈ R, we obtain a preference profile <+i for
agents in I ∪ {i} by adding <i to <. Similarly, when |I| > 1 and i ∈ I, <−i is the profile where
<i is deleted. We seek to aggregate the preferences of all members of a group into a collective
preference. To this end, we consider an aggregation function Φ that maps every preference
profile for every group to an element of R¯.
2. Conditions for Belief-Averaged Relative Utilitarianism
Our axioms for characterizing belief-averaged relative utilitarianism are in part generalizations
of Dhillon and Mertens’s axioms for relative utilitarianism in the context of risk. The first two,
restricted monotonicity and independence of redundant acts, carry the most power in the sense
that they rule out other aggregation functions one might come up with.
The restricted monotonicity axiom applies if a group I is indifferent between two acts f and g
and is joined by an agent i so that f induces the same distribution over consequences according
5
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to the group’s belief and agent i’s belief and so does g. In that case, the augmented group
I ∪ {i} should prefer f to g if and only if i does. Formally, for all I ∈ I, i ∈ N − I, < ∈ RI ,
and <i ∈ R with < = Φ(<) and <+i = Φ(<+i),
f ∼ g and f <i g implies f <+i g if π ◦ f
−1 = πi ◦ f
−1 and π ◦ g−1 = πi ◦ g
−1
(restricted monotonicity)
Moreover, a strict preference between f and g for agent i implies a strict collective preference.
In the terminology of Gilboa et al. (2004), f and g are lotteries.
The reasoning for independence of redundant acts is that two acts so that all agents are
indifferent between them are perfect substitutes for each other, thus making each redundant in
the presence of the other. It then prescribes that for two profiles that agree on a set of acts
that makes every other act redundant, the collective preferences over this set should also agree.
For all I ∈ I, <,<′ ∈ RI , and G ⊂ F ,
<|G = <
′|G implies Φ(<)|G = Φ(<
′)|G if for all f ∈ F there are g, g
′ ∈ G such that
f ∼i g and f ∼
′
i g
′ for all i ∈ I (independence of redundant acts)
By the conditions on G, its image in utility space is the same as that of F for both profiles <
and <′. That is, {(E<i(g))i∈I : g ∈ G} = {(E<i(f))i∈I : f ∈ F} and similarly for <
′.
The remaining four axioms are mostly standard. Monotonicity and independence of redun-
dant acts relate different profiles to each other, but do not anchor the aggregation function. For
example, there could be a phantom agent with fixed preferences and the collective preferences
of every group are derived from belief-averaged relative utilitarianism of the preferences of the
group’s members and the phantom agent. We can rule out phantom agents by requiring the
preferences of a single-agent group to be those of its sole member. For all i ∈ N and <i ∈ R,
Φ(<i) = <i (faithfulness)
Part of our definition of monotonicity is that an additional agent can break ties between
certain acts in her favor if she has a strict preference. It thus rules out that Φ ignores the utility
function of some agent altogether. But so far nothing prevents us from ignoring the beliefs of
an agent. To counter this, it suffices that no agent can impose her belief on a group. That is,
the belief of a group is not identical to that of one of its members unless the rest of the group
would arrive at that belief anyway. Formally, for all I ∈ I with |I| > 1, i ∈ I, and preference
profiles < ∈ RI where Φ(<) is not complete indifference and π and π′ are the beliefs associated
with Φ(<) and Φ(<−i),
π′ 6= πi implies π 6= πi (no belief imposition)
Continuity requires that a small changes in the agents’ preferences can only leads to small
changes in the collective preferences. To make this precise, we need to equip R and R¯ with
topologies. The uniform metric sup{|E<(f) − E<′(f)| : f ∈ F} induces a topology on R. The
set of profiles RI gets the product topology of R. The topology on R¯ is that of R plus the entire
6
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set R¯ (which is thus the only neighborhood of the relation expressing complete indifference).
Thus, R¯ is the closure of R in R¯.
Φ is continuous (continuity)
Lastly, anonymity prescribes that relabeling the agents within a group does not change the
collective preferences. For all I ∈ I and < ∈ RI ,
Φ(<) = Φ(< ◦ η) for all permutations η on I (anonymity)
Notice that anonymity as defined here is in general weaker than allowing η to be a bijection
between two groups J and I of the same size.
Our results remain true if we require all axioms except restricted monotonicity and faithfulness
to hold only for groups of size 2. Independence of redundant acts, continuity, and anonymity
are used only for profiles of two agents. The assumption that Φ does not allow belief imposition
is used for larger profiles, but it is not hard to check that this could be avoided.
3. Three Characterizations of Aggregation Functions
Conceptually, our most interesting result is a characterization of belief-averaged relative utili-
tarianism. We will obtain it as a corollary of Theorem 1, which uses the first five axioms (thus
excluding anonymity) to characterize affine aggregation functions. These functions assign two
positive weights to every agent, one for their belief and one for their utility function, and de-
termine the preferences of every group by adding up the weighted beliefs and utility functions
of its members. Importantly, the weights are constant across all profiles, that is, they cannot
depend on an agent’s own preferences, the preferences of any other agent, or who is a member
of the group.
Theorem 1. Let |X| ≥ 4 and Φ be an aggregation function. Then the following are equivalent.
(i) Φ satisfies restricted monotonicity, independence of redundant acts, faithfulness, no belief
imposition, and continuity
(ii) There are λ,µ ∈ RN++ such that for all I ∈ I and < ∈ R
I , Φ(<) is represented by
1∑
i∈I λi
∑
i∈I λiπi and
∑
i∈I µiui
When additionally requiring Φ to be anonymous, it follows at once that the weights of all
agents have to be equal. To see this, consider the two-agent group I = {i, j} and any profile
< ∈ RI so that the beliefs πi and πj and the utility functions ui and uj are distinct. Then
λiπi + λjπj 6= λiπj + λjπi whenever λi 6= λj. Likewise, µiui + µjuj 6= µiuj + µjui if µi 6= µj.
Thus, anonymity can only hold if λi = λj and µi = µj. Since multiplication of all weights by
the same positive constant does not change the collective preferences, we may assume that all
weights are equal to 1. This gives a characterization of belief-averaged relative utilitarianism as
the only aggregation function that satisfies all our axioms. It derives the collective preferences
by averaging the beliefs and adding up the normalized utility functions of all agents.
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Corollary 1. Let |X| ≥ 4 and Φ be an aggregation function. Then the following are equivalent.
(i) Φ satisfies restricted monotonicity, independence of redundant acts, faithfulness, no belief
imposition, continuity, and anonymity
(ii) For all I ∈ I and < ∈ RI , Φ(<) is represented by 1|I|
∑
i∈I πi and
∑
i∈I ui
The proof of Theorem 1 proceeds as follows. First, we only consider the implications of
restricted monotonicity, faithfulness, and no belief imposition. The former two imply the re-
stricted Pareto condition and thus that beliefs and utility functions are aggregated linearly (with
positive weights for utility functions by the strict part of monotonicity). The additional strength
of monotonicity lies in the fact that if an agent joins a group, the belief of the augmented group
is an affine combination of the belief of the original group and that of the agent. Assuming all
beliefs are affinely independent, it follows that the relative weights of the agents in the original
group cannot change. The analogous statement holds for utility functions.
Now, given any profile, we can apply this conclusion to every agent and the subprofile exclud-
ing this agent. It follows that the magnitude of the weight of the belief and the utility function
of an agent can only depend on her own preferences. The signs may however depend on the
preferences of the other agents. Since weights for utility functions have to be positive, any de-
pendence on other agents’ preferences vanishes for the weights of utility functions. Surprisingly,
continuity allows us to get the same conclusion for beliefs. If the weight for an agent’s belief ever
were to change sign, by continuity, her weight would have to be zero in some (two-agent) profile.
But then the second agent would get to impose her belief, which is ruled out. We conclude that
the weight for an agent’s belief cannot change sign. If it were to be negative regardless of her
preferences, we could find a profile where the collective belief assigns a negative probability to
some event, which gives a contradiction.
In summary, we derive the following intermediate result, which is interesting in its own right.
Proposition 1. Let |X| ≥ 4 and Φ be an aggregation function. Then the following are equiva-
lent.
(i) Φ satisfies restricted monotonicity, faithfulness, no belief imposition, and continuity
(ii) There are continuous functions λ,µ : R→ RN++ such that for all I ∈ I and < ∈ R
I , Φ(<)
is represented by 1∑
i∈I λi(<i)
∑
i∈I λi(<i)πi and
∑
i∈I µi(<i)ui
The last step is to show that additionally presuming independence of redundant acts gives
that the weights of an agent have to be constant, that is, that the functions λi and µi in
Proposition 1 are constant. By applying independence of redundant acts to a suitable two-
agent profile, it follows relatively quickly that the weights of an agent cannot depend on her
belief. To conclude they are independent of her utility function as well, we consider a two-
agent profile in which every act is unanimously indifferent to an act with a range of only three
consequences {x0, x1, x
∗}. If the focal agent changes her utility for other consequences in a way
that does not change the image of the profile in utility space, we can apply independence of
redundant acts and conclude that the collective preferences over acts with range {x0, x1, x
∗}
8
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do not change. This can only be if the weights of that agent remain the same. By repeatedly
applying this assertion, we can construct a path between any pair of utility functions so that
neighboring utility functions result in the same weights.
4. Necessity of the Axioms
We discuss the necessity of the axioms for Corollary 1 first since the examples we give here will
work for Theorem 1 and Proposition 1 as well.
Not much can be said about the aggregation function if it does not satisfy restricted mono-
tonicity. For example, every faithful function that is constant on profiles with two or more agents
satisfies all axioms except monotonicity. Here is an example, adapted from Dhillon and Mertens
(1999), that violates monotonicity but satisfies the restricted Pareto condition. The collective
belief is the average of the agents’ beliefs. Consider the closure of the profile in utility space
and let (ui)i∈I be the unique point that maximizes the product of utilities. Let the collective
utility function be the linear combination of the agents’ utility functions where the weight of
agent i is Πj∈I\{i}u
j . Since the weights for an agent are the same in any two profiles with the
same image in utility space, this function satisfies independence of redundant acts.
The class of functions which satisfy all axioms but independence of redundant acts and
anonymity is characterized by Proposition 1. Anonymity holds if and only if the weight functions
λi and µi are the same across agents.
Without faithfulness, we could have a “phantom agent” whose belief and utility function are
always added on top of the beliefs and utility functions of real agents with a constant weight.
If Φ is not continuous, agents with the same preferences could be handled specially. For
example, let (αn) be a strictly increasing positive sequence. Then if Φ(<) is represented by
1∑
<∈R αn(<)
∑
<∈R αn(<)πi and
∑
<∈R αn(<)ui, where n(<) is the number of agents in the profile
< with preferences <, then Φ satisfies all axioms but continuity.
It is open whether no belief imposition is necessary for the conclusion of Corollary 1. In
the absence of anonymity, that is, for Theorem 1, it is necessary, however. In that case, we
lose the decomposable form for the group belief if Φ allows belief imposition. For example, we
could have that the group belief is π1 whenever agent 1 is part of the group and
1
|I|
∑
i∈I πi
otherwise. Thus, whether the belief of an agent gets non-zero weight could depend on whether
some particular other agent is present.
For Proposition 1, continuity is even more vital. Without it, the weight of an agent’s belief
can even be negative. Consider Ω = [0, 1] equipped with the Borel sigma-algebra. Let π˜ be the
uniform distribution on Ω and, for a non-atomic measure π on Ω, let ρ(π) = sup{π(E)
π˜(E) : E ∈ Σ}.
(Since non-atomic measures have continuous density functions, ρ(π) is finite.) For i ≥ 2,
let λi(<i) =
1
3iρ(πi)
, and λ1 as well as all µi be constant at 1. If Φ(<) is represented as in
Proposition 1 except that the collective belief is π1 −
∑
i∈I−{1} λi(<i)πi whenever 1 ∈ I and
π1 = π˜, it satisfies all axioms but continuity.
Our proof requires |X| ≥ 4 since it relies on profiles with three linearly independent utility
functions. We do not know if our results hold when |X| = 3.
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5. Relationship to the Literature on Preference Aggregation Under
Uncertainty and Risk
Much of the early literature on group decision making under uncertainty has focused on the
Pareto condition, which requires that a unanimous preference among agents prevails in the
collective preferences. For decision making under risk, that is, when all agents have the same
belief and acts become lotteries, Harsanyi’s (1955) well-known theorem shows that under the
Pareto condition, the utility function of a group has to be a linear combination of the individ-
ual utility functions. Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) consider this condition in a multi-profile
framework under uncertainty and show that it is incompatible with non-dictatorship and sep-
arate aggregation of beliefs and utility functions. Mongin (1995) examines the implications of
different degrees of the Pareto condition for single profiles when individual and group prefer-
ences are of Savage-type as in the present paper. Roughly, he finds that it implies the existence
of a dictator for all but degenerate profiles. Mongin (1998) shows that this result persists in
Anscombe and Aumann’s (1963) model of subjective expected utility. It disappears if one al-
lows utility functions to be state-dependent, but reappears for intermediary preference models,
which allow identification of beliefs.
In contrast to these negative findings, Gilboa et al. (2004) show that the previously mentioned
restricted Pareto condition is equivalent to linear aggregation of beliefs and utility functions. In
particular, the restricted Pareto condition does not apply to what Mongin (2016) calls “spurious
unanimities”. Gilboa et al. (2014) consider an intermediate between the full and the restricted
Pareto condition, which they call no-betting-Pareto dominance. It states that one act dominates
another if it Pareto dominates it in the usual sense and there is a belief such that if all agents
held it, they would also unanimously prefer the first act to the second. They argue that no-
betting-Pareto dominance characterizes situations in which agents can benefit from trade, but
do not seek to determine how it restricts preference aggregation.
Among the few multi-profile approaches is that of Dietrich (2019), which adds consistency
with Bayesian updating and continuity of the aggregation function to the restricted Pareto con-
dition. These conditions imply that utilities are aggregated linearly and beliefs are aggregated
geometrically, that is, the group belief is a geometric mean of the individual beliefs. More-
over, the weight of an agent in either of these combinations can depend on the profile of utility
functions, but not on beliefs.
Several authors dispense with the assumption that collective preferences are based on subjec-
tive expected utility maximization. Most relevantly, Sprumont (2019) characterizes a different
form of relative utilitarianism where acts are compared by their cumulative expected utility∑
i∈I E<i(f) =
∑
i∈I
∫
Ω(ui ◦ f)dπi. By contrast, belief-averaged relative utilitarianism yields
the order induced by
∫
Ω
(∑
i∈I ui ◦ f
)
dπ, where π = 1|I|
∑
i∈I πi. Thus, the difference is whether
the expectation is taken before or after summing over agents. For his characterization, Sprumont
assumes the full Pareto axiom, independence of inessential expansions (a strengthening of inde-
pendence of redundant acts),1 belief irrelevance (the ranking of constant acts is independent of
1More precisely, independence of inessential expansions requires that if two profiles agree on a set of acts G so
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beliefs), and that collective preferences are continuous and satisfy Savage’s sure-thing principle.
As a high-level summary, one could say that the assumptions about the aggregation function
are stronger whereas those about collective preferences are weaker.
Alon and Gayer (2016) assume that groups have Gilboa and Schmeidler’s (1989) max-min
expected utility preferences, where acts are compared based on their minimal expected utility
within a set of beliefs. In addition to the restricted Pareto condition, they assume that if all
agents believe that one event is more likely than another, then so does the group. These two
axioms imply that utility functions are aggregated linearly and the set of group beliefs consists
of convex combinations of individual beliefs.
Nascimento (2012) studies the aggregation of the preferences of experts that agree on the
ranking of risky prospects, but are otherwise very general; in particular, they need not result
from subjective expected utility maximization. He gives a set of assumptions about the experts’
and the aggregated preferences under which the latter are the result of a compromise between
utilitarian aggregation and the Rawlsian criterion.
Some results from the literature on preference aggregation under risk are particularly rel-
evant. First, Dhillon and Mertens’s (1999) characterization of relative utilitarianism, which
derives the collective preference by adding up the normalized utility functions of the agents.
As Harsanyi, they assume that individual and collective preferences are given by linear utility
functions on lotteries. They require the aggregation function to satisfy continuity, anonymity,
a monotonicity condition, and independence of redundant alternatives.2 Monotonicity and in-
dependence of redundant alternatives are analogs of restricted monotonicity and independence
of redundant acts. In the same vein, Dhillon (1998) characterizes relative utilitarianism with a
Pareto condition for groups of agents instead of monotonicity. It requires that if two disjoint
groups agree on the preference between two lotteries, then the union of both groups enter-
tains the same preference. Like our monotonicity condition, it acts on variable sets of agents.
Börgers and Choo (2017a) discovered a flaw in Dhillon’s proof, which presumably stems from
the fact that she allows agents to have equal or opposite utility functions without assuming
continuity. Börgers and Choo (2017b) provide a more accessible characterization of relative
utilitarianism along the same lines as Dhillon and Mertens.
6. Conclusions and Open Problems
We have shown that restricted monotonicity and independence of redundant acts in conjunction
with three axioms which require the aggregation function to be well-behaved, that is, faithful,
continuous, and free from belief imposition, necessitate affine aggregation of beliefs and utility
functions with constant weights. If anonymity holds in addition, all weights have to be equal and
belief-averaged relative utilitarianism remains as the only possibility. These results are based
on a characterization of aggregation functions that satisfy monotonicity but not necessarily
that G contains a most-preferred and a least-preferred act for every agent, then the collective preferences over
acts in G are the same for both profiles.
2Dhillon and Mertens (1999) use a weaker monotonicity condition, but one which also allows them to prove the
equivalent of our Lemma 5.
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independence of redundant acts. We have thus drawn a clear picture of monotonic aggregation
functions.
We leave open if there is a succinct representation of the class of functions that satisfy
independence of redundant acts (plus perhaps some standard axioms). In particular, it is
unclear how much independence of redundant acts restricts the aggregation of beliefs. Finally,
it would be desirable to determine whether ruling out belief imposition is necessary for the
conclusion of Corollary 1.
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APPENDIX: Proofs
An aggregation function Φ gives rise to two functions φ and ψ, which take a profile < ∈ RI for
an arbitrary group I to a collective belief φ(<) ∈ Π and a collective utility function ψ(<) ∈ U¯ .
Whenever the collective utility function is trivial, that is, ψ(<) = 0, φ(<) is not uniquely
determined. In fact, it can be arbitrary.
Preferences are invariant under multiplication of the belief by a positive constant and positive
affine transformations of utility functions. For measures π, π′ on Ω and utility functions u, u′ on
X, we write π ≡ π′ if π = απ′ for some α > 0 and u ≡ u′ if u = αu′ + β for α > 0 and β ∈ R.
Theorem 1 requires that we find λ,µ ∈ RN++ such that φ(<) ≡
∑
i∈I λiπi and ψ(<) ≡∑
i∈I µiui for all I ∈ I and < ∈ R
I . The proof proceeds in three main steps. First, we
examine the implications of restricted monotonicity in conjunction with faithfulness and no
belief imposition. These axioms imply that in almost all profiles, the weights assigned to
an agent’s belief and utility function can only depend on her own preferences. The weights
for beliefs may be negative however. Second, we add continuity, which allows us to rule out
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negative weights and to extend the obtained representation to all profiles (Proposition 1). Lastly,
independence of redundant acts implies that the weights of an agent cannot depend on her own
preferences either and thus have to be constant across all profiles.
A. Implications of Restricted Monotonicity
The proofs that the weight of the belief and the weight of the utility function of an agent can
only depend on her own preferences in Sections A.1 and A.2 proceed along the same lines.
For the most part, the proof for beliefs requires more work, since we cannot rule out negative
weights. Thus, we advise readers interested in the proofs to take a look at Appendix A.2 first.
A.1. Aggregation of Beliefs
The first lemma is the basis from which we will derive all further conclusions about belief
aggregation. It states that if an agent joins a group, the new group belief is an affine combination
of the previous group belief and the belief of the agent. The restricted Pareto condition of
Gilboa et al. (2004) already implies that the collective belief is an affine combination of its
members’ beliefs. The additional strength of this conclusion lies in the fact that no matter
which belief the new agent holds, it is always combined with the same belief of the original
group. If we assume that an agent cannot impose her belief on the group, her weight in the
affine combination cannot be 1.
Lemma 1. Assume that Φ satisfies restricted monotonicity and rules out belief imposition. Let
I ∈ I, i ∈ I, and < ∈ RI with ψ(<) 6= 0. Then, φ(<) = (1 − α)φ(<−i) + απi for some
α ∈ R− {1}.
Proof. Let < = Φ(<) and <−i = Φ(<−i). Monotonicity implies that f ∼ g whenever f ∼−i g,
f ∼i g and φ(<−i) ◦ f
−1 = πi ◦ f
−1 and φ(<−i) ◦ g
−1 = πi ◦ g
−1. Thus, (the two-agent case of)
Theorem 1 of Gilboa et al. (2004) implies that φ(<) = (1 − α)φ(<−i) + απi for some α ∈ R.
If πi = φ(<−i), we can choose α arbitrarily. Otherwise, πi 6= φ(<), since Φ rules out belief
imposition, and so α 6= 1.
Lemma 2. Assume that Φ satisfies restricted monotonicity and faithfulness and rules out belief
imposition. Let I ∈ I and < ∈ RI with ψ(<) 6= 0. Then φ(<) =
∑
i∈I λiπi for some λ ∈ R
I
with
∑
i∈I λi = 1. Moreover, if (πi)i∈I are affinely independent, then λ ∈ (R − {0})
I and λ is
unique.
Proof. Since Φ is faithful, we have that φ(<1) = π1. Now let one agent after another join. We
apply Lemma 1 at each step and get φ(<) =
∑
i∈I λiπi for some λ ∈ R
I with
∑
i∈I λi = 1.
If (πi)i∈I are affinely independent, λ is unique. We prove by induction over |I| that λi 6= 0
for all i. If |I| = 1, then λ = 1 is forced. Now suppose that |I| > 1 and let i, j ∈ I. By the
induction hypothesis, we have φ(<−i) =
∑
k∈I−{i} λ
′
kπk and φ(<−j) =
∑
k∈I−{j} λ
′′
kπk for some
λ′ ∈ (R − {0})I−{i} and λ′′ ∈ (R− {0})I−{j}. Lemma 1 implies that
φ(<) = (1− α)φ(<−i) + απi = (1− β)φ(<−j) + βπj
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for some α, β ∈ R− {1}. We set λ = ((1− α)λ′, α) = ((1− β)λ′′, β), where α and β appear in
position i and j respectively. Since α 6= 1 and λ′k 6= 0, it follows that λk 6= 0 for all k ∈ I − {i}.
Similarly, β 6= 1 implies that λk 6= 0 for all k ∈ I − {j}.
We define the dimension of a vector of beliefs pi ∈ ΠI as the maximal number of affinely
independent probability distributions in {πi : i ∈ I}. Equivalently, the dimension of pi is the
dimension of the subset {(πi(E))i∈I : E ∈ Σ} of R
I . For later use, we prove a fact for pi with
dimension at least 3.
Lemma 3. Assume that Φ satisfies restricted monotonicity and rules out belief imposition. Let
I ∈ I and < ∈ RI with ψ(<) 6= 0. If pi has dimension at least 3, there are distinct i, j ∈ I such
that φ(<−i,j), πi, and πj are affinely independent.
Proof. Suppose {1, 2, 3} ⊂ I. Since pi has dimension at least 3, we may assume that π1, π2,
and π3 are affinely independent. So φ(<) cannot be in the affine hull of all three pairs from
{π1, π2, π3}, for if say φ(<) is in the affine hull of {π1, π2} and {π1, π3}, then φ(<) = π1 and so
is not in the affine hull of {π2, π3}. Assume that φ(<) is not in the affine hull of {π1, π2}. Then
Lemma 1 implies that φ(<−1,2) is not in the affine hull of {π1, π2}. Since π1 6= π2, φ(<−1,2), π1,
and π2 are affinely independent.
Lemma 2 ensures that the group belief is always an affine combination of the agents’ beliefs.
To show that φ has the form claimed in Theorem 1, we have to prove that the relative weight
of an agent in this affine combination depends only on her own belief and utility function. For
now, we have to be contempt with a weaker conclusion, which allows negative weights. For the
rest of this section, we will assume that beliefs and utility functions are pairwise distinct in all
profiles.
Lemma 4. Assume that Φ satisfies restricted monotonicity and faithfulness and rules out belief
imposition. Then there are λ : R → (R − {0})N and for all I ∈ I, σI : RI → { − 1, 1}I such
that for all I ∈ I and < ∈ RI , φ(<) ≡
∑
i∈I σ
I
i (<)λi(<i)πi. Moreover,
σIi (<)
σIj (<)
=
σ
{i,j}
i (<i,<j)
σ
{i,j}
j
(<i,<j)
for
all I, i, j ∈ I, and < ∈ RI .
Proof. For l ∈ R − {1, 2}, let Il = {1, 2, l} and Rl ⊂ R
Il be the set of all profiles for agents
Il such that π1, π2, and πl are affinely independent. Let l ∈ N − {1, 2} be arbitrary and
fix some <˜ ∈ Rl. By Lemma 2, there is a unique function κ : Rl → (R − {0})
Il such that
φ(<) =
∑
i∈Il
κi(<)πi for all < ∈ Rl. For i, j ∈ Il and < ∈ Rl, let λ
i,j(<) =
κj(<−j ,<˜j)κi(<)
κj(<˜)κi(<−j ,<˜j)
.
The fact that κ maps to (R−{0})Il ensures that λi,j is well-defined. Then, let λi(<i) =
|κi(<)|
|λi,j(<)|
and σIli (<) = sign(κi(<)).
We show that λi is independent of j and <−i and thus well-defined. We proceed in three
steps. Before, note that the projection of Rl to R that returns the preferences of i is onto, and
so λi is a function on all of R.
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Step 1. Let k ∈ Il − {i, j}. We show that
κi(<)
κj(<)
is independent of <k. To this end, let <
′ ∈ Rl
such that <−k
′ = <−k. By Lemma 1, we have that
φ(<) = (1− α)φ(<−k) + απk = κi(<)πi + κj(<)πj + κk(<)πk, and
φ(<′) = (1− β)φ(<−k
′) + βπ′k = κi(<
′)πi + κj(<
′)πj + κk(<
′)π′k,
for some α, β ∈ R− {1}. Affine independence of π1, π2, πl and π1, π2, π
′
l implies that κi(<)πi +
κj(<)πj ≡ φ(<−k) = φ(<−k
′) ≡ κi(<
′)πi + κj(<
′)πj . In particular,
κi(<)
κj(<)
= κi(<
′)
κj(<
′)
. Repeated
application yields the desired independence.
Step 2. We show that λi,j(<) is independent of i and j. This is tedious, but only uses Step 1.
Let k ∈ Il − {i, j}. First we show independence of j.
λi,j(<) =
κj(<−j, <˜j)κi(<)
κj(<˜)κi(<−j, <˜j)
=
κj(<−j,k, <˜k, <˜j)κi(<)
κj(p˜i)κi(<−j,k, <˜k, <˜j)
=
κj(<−j,k, <˜k, <˜j)κi(<)κk(<−j,k, <˜k, <˜j)
κj(<˜)κi(<−j,k, <˜k, <˜j)κk(<−j,k, <˜k, <˜j)
=
κj(<˜)κk(<−k, <˜k)κi(<)
κj(<˜)κi(<−k, <˜k)κk(<˜)
= λi,k(<)
Verifying independence of i is very similar.
λi,j(<) =
κj(<−j, <˜j)κi(<)
κj(<˜)κi(<−j, <˜j)
=
κj( ˜<−k,i,<k,<i)κi(<)
κj(<˜)κi( ˜<−k,i,<k,<i)
=
κj( ˜<−k,i,<k,<i)κi(<)κk( ˜<−k,i,<k,<i)
κj(<˜)κi( ˜<−k,i,<k,<i)κk( ˜<−k,i,<k,<i)
=
κj(<−j, <˜j)κi(<)κk(<)
κj(<˜)κi(<)κk(<−j, <˜j)
= λk,j(<)
Step 3. We show that λi(<) is independent of <−i and j.
λi(<i) =
|κi(<)|
|λi,j(<)|
=
|κj(<˜)κi(<−j, <˜j)|
|κj(<−j, <˜j)|
=
|κj(<˜)κi(<˜−i,<i)|
|κj(<˜−i,<i)|
,
where we use Step 1 for the last equality. The resulting term is independent of <−i and, by
Step 2, of j.
Now it is easy to see that
φ(<) =
∑
i∈Il
κi(<)πi ≡
∑
i∈Il
κi(<)
|λi,ji(<)|
πi =
∑
i∈Il
σ
Il
i (<)λi(<i)πi,
where ji ∈ Il − {i} for all i. For the second equality, we used the fact that λ
i,j is independent
of i and j.
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Since l was arbitrary, we have now defined λi for each i ∈ N. However, we have defined λ1
and λ2 multiple times, once for each l ∈ N − {1, 2}. So we have to check that these definitions
are not conflicting. It follows from Lemma 1 that the ratio between λ1 and λ2 is the same for
each triple {1, 2, l}. Thus, we can define λ1 and λ2 as obtained for, say, l = 3 and scale the
triples (λ1, λ2, λl) obtained for the remaining l appropriately.
Step 4. Now we define σ for the remaining profiles. Our strategy will be to first define it for
two-agent profiles, then inductively for all profiles such that pi has dimension at least 3, and
then for the remaining profiles. At each point, we maintain that
σIi (<)
σIj (<)
=
σ
{i,j}
i (%i,%j)
σ
{i,j}
j (%i,%j)
, which we
will refer to as the ratio condition on σ. We omit the superscript in expressions like σIi (<) from
now on, since it is clear from the profile.
Let I ∈ I and < ∈ RI . If |I| = 2, say I = {1, 2}, then φ(<) = α1π1 + α2π2 for a unique
α ∈ (R− {0})I . We define σi(<) = sign(αi) for i ∈ I.
Now assume that |I| ≥ 3 and pi has dimension at least 3; assume further that we have defined
σ for all profiles of dimension three on fewer than |I| agents such that the ratio condition holds.
Let i ∈ I such that πi 6= φ(<−i), which exists by Lemma 3. We show that there is s ∈ {−1, 1}
such that s
σj(<−i)
=
σi(%i,%j)
σj(%i,%j)
for all j ∈ I − {i}. If not, there are j, k which require s = 1 and
s = −1 respectively. It is not hard to see that then there must be j, k with this property such
that (πi, πj , πk) has dimension 3. Then we have
σj(<−i)
σk(<−i)
=
σj(%j,%k)
σk(%j,%k)
6=
σj(%i,%j)
σi(%i,%j)
σi(%i,%k)
σk(%i,%k)
=
σj(<i,j,k)
σi(<i,j,k)
σi(<i,j,k)
σk(<i,j,k)
=
σj(<i,j,k)
σk(<i,j,k)
where we use the fact that σI−{i} satisfies the ratio condition for the first equality. This is a
contradiction, since σ{i,j,k} also satisfies the ratio condition. Thus we can find s as required.
Lemma 1 implies that φ(<) = (1 − α)φ(<−i) + απi for some unique α ∈ R − {1}. If α < 1,
we set σI = (σI−{i}, s); if α > 1, set σI = −(σI−{i}, s).
Lastly, if pi has dimension 2, let i ∈ N−I and consider a profile <′ for agents in I∪{i} such that
<−i
′ = < and pi′ has dimension 3. By Lemma 2, π′i 6= φ(<) and so φ(<
′) = (1− α)φ(<) + απ′i
for some α 6= 1. If α < 1, we set σj(<) = σj(<
′) for all j ∈ I; if α > 1, set σj(<) = −σj(<
′).
We still have to make sure that these definitions of λ and σ are consistent with φ. For I ∈ I
and < ∈ RI , let φ¯(<) ≡
∑
i∈I σ
I
i (<)λi(<i)πi. We show by induction over |I| that φ and φ¯ agree
on all profiles <. First we assume that pi has dimension at least 3. Later we will take care of
the remaining profiles.
We start with two observations.
Step 5. Let < be a profile for agents in I such that pi has dimension 3 and pi−i has dimension
2. If φ and φ¯ agree on <, then they also agree on <−i. By Lemma 1 and the assumption, we
have
φ(<) = (1− α)φ(<−i) + απi ≡
∑
j∈I−{i}
σj(<)λj(<j)πj + σi(<)λi(<i)πi
for some α ∈ R − {1}. Since πi is not in the affine hull of (πj)j∈I−{i}, we have to have
(1 − α)φ(<−i) ≡
∑
j∈I−{i} σj(<)λj(<j)πj. If α < 1, then by definition, σj(<−i) = σj(<)
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for all j ∈ I − {i}, and so φ(<−i) ≡
∑
j∈I−{i} σj(<−i)λj(<j)πj ≡ φ¯(<−i). If α > 1, then
σj(<−i) = −σj(<) for all j, and again φ(<−i) = φ¯(<−i) follows.
Step 6. Let < be a profile for agents in I and i, j ∈ I. If φ and φ¯ agree on <−i and <−j and
φ¯(<−i,j), πi, and πj are affinely independent, then they also agree on <. Lemma 1 implies that
φ(<) = (1− α)φ(<−j) + απj = (1− β)φ(<−i) + βπi
for some α, β ∈ R − {1}. To make notation less cumbersome, we write σk(<−J) = σ
J
k and
λk(<k) = λk for k ∈ I and J ⊂ I − {i} for the rest of this step. Four cases arise, depending on
whether α and β are greater of smaller than 1.
Case 1. Assume α, β < 1. By definition of σ, we have that σk = σ
j
k for all k ∈ I − {j} and
σk = σ
i
k for all k ∈ I − {i}. In particular, σ
i
k = σ
j
k for k ∈ I − {i, j}. Moreover, either σ
ij
k = σ
i
k
for all k ∈ I − {i, j} or σijk = −σ
i
k for all k. Let s = 1 in the former case and s = −1 otherwise.
Then,
φ(<) ≡ s

 ∑
k∈I−{i,j}
σ
ij
k λkπk


︸ ︷︷ ︸
φ(<−i,j)
+σji λiπi + α
′πj = s

 ∑
k∈I−{i,j}
σ
ij
k λkπk

+ β′πi + σijλjπj
for some α′, β′ ∈ R. Affine independence implies that α′ = σijλj = σjλj . Moreover, σ
j
i = σi and
sσ
ij
k = σ
i
k = σk. So φ(<) =
∑
k∈I σkλkπk, which concludes this case.
Case 2. Assume α > 1 and β < 1. By definition of σ, we have that σk = −σ
j
k for all k ∈ I−{j}
and σk = σ
i
k for all k ∈ I − {i}. In particular, σ
i
k = −σ
j
k for k ∈ I − {i, j}. Moreover, either
σ
ij
k = σ
j
k for all k ∈ I − {i, j} or σ
ij
k = −σ
j
k for all k. Let s = 1 in the former case and s = −1
otherwise. Then,
φ(<) ≡ −φ(<−j) + α
′πj ≡ −s
∑
k∈I−{i,j}
σ
ij
k λkπk − σ
j
i λiπi + α
′πj , and
≡ φ(<−i) + β
′πi ≡ −s
∑
k∈I−{i,j}
σ
ij
k λkπk + β
′πi + σ
i
jλjπj
for some α′, β′ ∈ R. The second equality in the second line follows from −sσijk = −σ
j
k = σ
i
k for
k ∈ I − {i, j}. Affine independence implies that α′ = σijλj = σjλj . Moreover, −σ
j
i = σi and
−sσijk = −σ
j
k = σk. So φ(<) =
∑
k∈I σkλkπk.
The remaining two cases are analogous to the two we have examined and therefore omitted.
Step 7. We have shown that φ and φ¯ agree for groups I = {1, 2, l} for all l, which we use for
the base case |I| = 3. Let I = {1, i, j} for distinct i, j ∈ N − {1} and < ∈ RI such that π1, πi,
and πj are affinely independent. Observe that φ and φ¯ agree on the subprofiles <−i and <−j
of < by Step 5. Since φ¯(<−i,j) = π1, πi, and πj are affinely independent, Step 6 implies that φ
and φ¯ agree on <. With a second application of the same argument, we get that φ and φ¯ agree
on all profiles of three agents with affinely independent beliefs.
In the rest of the proof, we deal with the case |I| ≥ 4. Moreover, we assume that pi has
dimension at least 3 for now.
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Case 1. Suppose pi−k has dimension 2 for some k ∈ I. Thus, all beliefs in pi−k are linear
combinations of πi and πj for distinct but otherwise arbitrary i, j ∈ I − {k}. Since pi has
dimension 3, πk is not in the affine hull of the beliefs in pi−k. So any subprofile of pi with at
least three agents one of which is k has dimension 3. By the induction hypothesis, φ and φ¯
agree on such profiles except for possibly pi itself. In particular, they agree on <−i and <−j.
Moreover, φ¯(<−i,j) = απi + βπj + γπk for α, β, γ ∈ R with γ 6= 0 by Lemma 2. So φ¯(<−i,j), πi,
and πj are affinely independent. By Step 6, we get that φ and φ¯ agree on <.
Case 2. The remaining case is that pi−k has dimension 3 for all k ∈ I. The induction hypothesis
implies that φ and φ¯ agree on <−j and <−i. The argument in the proof of Lemma 3 also applies
to φ¯, and so we can choose distinct i, j ∈ I such that φ¯(<−i,j), πj , and πi are affinely independent.
We again conclude from Step 6 that φ and φ¯ agree on <.
Now let < be an arbitrary profile for agents in I. We have covered the case when pi has
dimension at least 3. If pi has dimension 2, let i ∈ N − I and (<˜) be a profile for agents in
I ∪ {i} such that <˜−i = < and p˜i has dimension 3. Then φ(<˜) = φ¯(<˜) and so Step 5 applies,
which gives φ(<) = φ¯(<). Single-agent profiles are covered by Lemma 2.
A.2. Aggregation of Utility Functions
To begin with, it is useful to clarify the linear algebra on U¯ . Elements of U¯ are normalized
representatives of a class of utility functions, consisting of all its positive affine transformations.
Thus, we say that (ui)i∈I are linearly independent if their span does not include any utility
function that is equivalent to the 0 element of U¯ , that is, any constant utility function.
We show that the collective utility function of a group containing agent i is a linear combina-
tion of the utility function of i and that of the group without i. If the latter two utility functions
are not equal to completely opposed, then i has positive weight in this linear combination. In
Lemma 6, we leverage this fact to prove that the collective utility function of any group is a
positive linear combination of the utility functions of its members.
Lemma 5. Assume that Φ satisfies monotonicity. Let I ∈ I, i ∈ I, and < ∈ RI . Then
ψ(<) = αψ(<−i) + βui for some α, β ∈ R. Moreover, if ui 6= ±ψ(<−i), then β > 0 and β is
unique.
Proof. Let < = Φ(<), <−i = Φ(<−i), and π−i = φ(<−i). We start in the same way as for
Lemma 1. Monotonicity implies that f ∼ g whenever f ∼−i g, f ∼i g, π−i ◦ f
−1 = πi ◦ f
−1,
and π−i ◦ g
−1 = πi ◦ g
−1. Thus, it follows from Theorem 1 of Gilboa et al. (2004) that ψ(<) =
αψ(<−i) + βui for some α, β ∈ R.
If ui 6= ±ψ(<−i), then β is unique. Moreover, we can find probability distributions p and q on
X with finite support such that ψ(<−i)(p) = ψ(<−i)(q) and ui(p) > ui(q). Liapounoff’s (1940)
theorem allows us to construct acts f and g with the following properties: they induce the
distributions p and q under π−i and πi, that is, p = π−i ◦ f
−1 = πi ◦ f
−1 and q = π−i ◦ g
−1 =
πi◦g
−1; Thus, f ∼−i g and f ≻i g. Since Φ is monotonic, we get that f ≻ g. From Lemma 1, we
know that φ(<) is an affine combination of π−i and πi, and so φ(<)◦f
−1 = p and φ(<)◦g−1 = q.
It follows that f ≻ g if and only if ψ(<)(p) > ψ(<)(q). Thus, β > 0.
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Lemma 6. Assume that Φ satisfies monotonicity and faithfulness. Let I ∈ I and < ∈ RI .
Then ψ(<) =
∑
i∈I µiui for some µ ∈ R
I . If (ui)i∈I are linearly independent, µ ∈ R
I
++ and µ
is unique.
Proof. The first part is a straightforward corollary of Lemma 5. For the second part, assume that
(ui)i∈I are linearly independent. Let µ ∈ R
I such that ψ(<) =
∑
i∈I µiui. Linear independence
implies that µ is unique and ui 6= ±ψ(<−i) for all i ∈ I. Thus, Lemma 5 implies that ψ(<) =
αψ(<−i) + βui for α ∈ R and β > 0. Since ψ(<−i) is a linear combination of (uj)j∈I−{i} and
µ is unique, it follows that µi = β > 0.
The dimension of an vector of utility functions u ∈ U I is the maximal number of linearly
independent utility functions in {ui : i ∈ I}. The next lemma is the analogue of Lemma 3. Its
proof is similar and therefore omitted.
Lemma 7. Assume that Φ satisfies restricted monotonicity. Let I ∈ I and < ∈ RI with
ψ(<) 6= 0. If u has dimension at least 3, there are distinct i, j ∈ I such that ψ(<−i,j), ui, and
uj are linearly independent.
In general, µ may depend on <. The content of the next lemma is that µi must not depend
on <−i. For the rest of this section, we assume that beliefs and utility functions are pairwise
distinct in any profile.
Lemma 8. Assume that |X| ≥ 4 and Φ satisfies monotonicity and faithfulness. Then there is
µ : R→ RN++ such that ψ(<) ≡
∑
i∈I µi(<i)ui for all I ∈ I and < ∈ R
I .
Proof. The first part is very similar to the construction of λ in the proof of Lemma 4. For
l ∈ N − {1, 2}, let Il = {1, 2, l} and Rl be the set of all < ∈ R
Il such that u1, u2, and ul are
linearly independent. Let l ∈ N − {1, 2} be arbitrary and fix some <˜ ∈ Rl. By Lemma 6,
there is a unique function ν : Rl → R
Il
++ such that ψ(<) =
∑
i∈Il
νi(<)ui for all < ∈ Rl. For
i, j ∈ Il and < ∈ Rl, let λ
i,j(<) =
νj(<−j ,<˜j)νi(<)
νj(<˜)νi(<−j ,<˜j)
. The fact that ν maps to RIl++ ensures that
λi,j is well-defined and positive. Then, let µi(<i) =
νi(<)
λi,j(<)
. Note that the projection of Rl to
R that returns the preferences of i is onto, and so µi is a function on all of R. Here we use the
assumption that |X| ≥ 4, as otherwise Rl is empty.
With the same arguments as in the proof of Lemma 4, we can show that νi(<)
νj(<)
is independent
of <k for k ∈ Il − {i, j}, that λ
i,j is independent of i and j, and that µi is well-defined. Then
we have
ψ(<) =
∑
i∈Il
νi(<)ui ≡
∑
i∈I
νi(<)
λi,ji(<)
ui =
∑
i∈I
µi(<i)ui,
where ji ∈ I − {i} for all i ∈ I.
Since l was arbitrary, we have now defined µi for each i ∈ N. However, we have defined µ1
and µ2 multiple times, once for each l ∈ N − {1, 2}. So we have to check that these definitions
are not conflicting. It follows from Lemma 1 that the ratio between µ1 and µ2 is the same for
each triple {1, 2, l}. Thus, we can define µ1 and µ2 as obtained for, say, l = 3 and scale the
triples (µ1, µ2, µl) obtained for the remaining l appropriately.
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µ defines a function that returns a collective utility function for every profile. For I ∈ I and
< ∈ RI , let ψ¯(<) ≡
∑
i∈I µi(<i)ui. The following two observations will carry us a long way in
the rest of the proof.
Step 1. Let < be a profile for agents in I such that u has dimension 3 and u−i has dimension
2. If ψ and ψ¯ agree on <, then they also agree on <−i. By Lemma 5 and the assumption, we
have
ψ(<) = αψ(<−i) + βui ≡
∑
j∈I−{i}
µj(<j)uj + µi(<i)ui
for some α, β ∈ R. Since ui is not in the span of (uj)j∈I−{i}, we get that ψ(<−i) ≡∑
j∈I−{i} µj(<j)uj ≡ ψ¯(<−i).
Step 2. Let < be a profile for agents in I and i, j ∈ I. If ψ¯(<−i,j), ui, and uj are linearly
independent and ψ and ψ¯ agree on <−i and <−j , then they also agree on <.
Lemma 5 and Lemma 6 imply that
ψ(<) ≡ ψ(<−j) + αuj ≡
≡ψ¯(<−j)︷ ︸︸ ︷∑
k∈I−{i,j}
µk(<k)uk + µi(<i)ui+α
′uj, and
ψ(<) ≡ ψ(<−i) + βui ≡
∑
k∈I−{i,j}
µk(<k)uk
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡ψ¯(<−i,j)
+β′ui + µj(<j)uj
for some α,α′β, β′ ∈ R++. Linear independence of ψ¯(<−i,j), ui, and uj implies that α
′ = µj(<j),
and so ψ and ψ¯ agree on <.
With all this in place, we can finish the proof. First we show by induction over |I| that ψ and
ψ¯ agree on all profiles where u has dimension at least 3. Later we take care of the remaining
profiles later.
The base case is |I| = 3. Let < ∈ RI . First assume that I = {1, i, j} for distinct i, j ∈ N−{1}.
We have shown that ψ and ψ¯ agree for groups of the form {1, 2, l} for any l. Thus Step 1 implies
that they agree on <−i and <−j . Moreover, ψ¯(<−i,j) = u1, ui, and uj are linearly independent.
So Step 2 implies that ψ and ψ¯ agree on <. A second iteration of the same argument implies
that they agree on profiles for three arbitrary agents.
Now we deal with the case |I| ≥ 4 and again assume that u has dimension at least 3.
Case 1. Suppose ψ(<) = 0 or ψ¯(<) = 0. We show that ψ(<) = 0 if and only if ψ¯(<) = 0.
Assume for contradiction that ψ(<) 6= 0 and ψ¯(<) = 0. By Lemma 7, we can find distinct i, j
such that ψ(<−i,j), ui, and uj are linearly independent. Since |I| ≥ 4, u−i,j has dimension at
least 2. If it has dimension exactly 2, then either u−i or u−j has dimension 3, as otherwise u
would have dimension 2. Suppose u−j has dimension at least 3. By the induction hypothesis,
ψ(<−j) = ψ¯(<−j). Since ψ(<−i,j), ui, and uj are linearly independent, we can conclude that
uj 6= ±ψ(<−j). But ψ¯(<) ≡ ψ¯(<−j) + αuj for some α > 0, and so since ±uj 6= ψ(<−j) =
ψ¯(<−j), we get ψ¯(<) 6= 0.
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The proof is similar if ψ(<) = 0 and ψ¯(<) 6= 0. Note however, that we find i, j such
that ψ¯(<−i,j), ui, and uj are linearly independent not directly by Lemma 7, but by the same
argument as in its proof.
Case 2. Suppose u−k has dimension 2 for some k ∈ I. Thus, all beliefs in u−k are linear
combinations of ui and uj for distinct but otherwise arbitrary i, j ∈ I − {k}. Since u has
dimension 3, uk is not in the span of the utility functions in u−k. So any subprofile of u with at
least 3 agents one of which is k has dimension 3. By the induction hypothesis, ψ and ψ¯ agree on
such profiles except for possibly < itself. In particular, they agree on <−i and <−j . Moreover,
ψ¯(<−i,j) = αui + βuj + γuk for α, β, γ ∈ R with γ > 0 by definition of ψ¯. So ψ¯(<−i,j), ui, and
uj are linearly independent. Step 2 implies that ψ(<) = ψ¯(<).
Case 3. The remaining case is that u−k has dimension at least 3 for all k ∈ I. The induction
hypothesis implies that ψ and ψ¯ agree on <−i and <−j. By Lemma 7 we can choose distinct
i, j ∈ I such that ψ(<−i,j), ui, and uj are linearly independent. If u−i,j has dimension 3, the
induction hypothesis implies that ψ and ψ¯ agree on <−i,j. If u−i,j has dimension 2, then we use
the fact that u−i has dimension 3 to apply Step 1 and conclude that ψ and ψ¯ agree on <−i,j.
In either case, ψ¯(<−i,j), ui, and uj are linearly independent. So Step 2 implies that ψ and ψ¯
agree on <.
Now let < be an arbitrary profile for agents in I. We have covered the case when u has
dimension at least 3. If u has dimension 2, let i ∈ N − I and <˜ be a profile for agents in
I ∪ {i} such that <˜−i = < and u˜ has dimension 3. Then ψ(<˜) = ψ¯(<˜), and so Step 1 implies
ψ(<) = ψ¯(<). Single-agent profiles are covered by Lemma 6.
B. Implications of Continuity
Let us first define topologies on Π and U∗, which we do in the same way as for R¯. For π, π′ ∈ Π,
the uniform metric sup{|π(E) − π′(E)| : E ∈ Σ} gives a topology on π. For u, u′ ∈ U (note the
absence of constant utility function 0), we also use the uniform metric sup{|u(x) − u′(x)| : x ∈
X}. The topology on U¯ is that of U plus the entire set U¯ . So the only neighborhood of 0 is
the set U¯ itself. This is the topology U¯ inherits from the space of all utility functions equipped
with the uniform metric when forming the quotient via normalization.
The mappings from preference relations to beliefs and utility functions are now continuous.
Likewise, the inverse operation mapping a pair of belief and utility function to a preference
relation is continuous. Lemma 5 of Dietrich (2019) is the equivalent of this statement in his
framework. To ease notation in the proof of the next lemma, when E is an event and x, y are
consequences, we write xEy for the act which yields x for states in E and y for states in Ω−E.
Lemma 9. The correspondence π(<) and the function u(<) mapping < ∈ R¯ to the beliefs
and the utility function representing < are (upper-hemi) continuous. Moreover, the function
<(π, u) mapping each pair of belief and utility function to the preference relation it induces is
continuous.
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Proof. Let (<n) be a sequence that converges to < in R¯. For each n, let πn ∈ π(<n) and
un = u(<n).
First we show that (un) converges to u = u(<). Let x ∈ X and fx be the act that returns x
in all states. We have sup{|un(x) − u(x)| : x ∈ X} = sup{|E<n(fx) − E<(fx)| : x ∈ X}, and so
(un) converges uniformly to u.
Second, assume that (πn) converges to π′ ∈ Π. We have to show π′ ∈ π(<). If u = 0, then
π(<) = Π and there is nothing to show. Otherwise, π(<) = {π} for some π ∈ Π. We show
that (πn) converges to π, which implies π = π′. Since u 6= 0, we can choose x, y ∈ X such that
u(x) > u(y).
Then, for large enough n, sup{|πn(E) − π(E)| : E ∈ Σ} = sup{|
E<n (xEy)−u
n(y)
un(x)−un(y) −
E<(xEy)−u(y)
u(x)−u(y) | : E ∈ Σ} ≤
2
u(x)−u(y) sup{|E<n(xEy)− E<(xEy)| : E ∈ Σ}, and so (π
n) converges
uniformly to π.
Conversely, assume that (πn) and (un) converge to π and u, respectively, and let <n =
<(πn, un) and < = <(π, u) be the induced preference relations. For ǫ > 0, let n0 ∈ N such that
for n ≥ n0, sup{|π
n(E) − π(E)| : E ∈ Σ} < ǫ2 and sup{|u
n(x) − u(x)| : x ∈ X} < ǫ2 . Then, for
all n ≥ n0 and f ∈ F ,
|E<n(f)− E<(f)| = |
∫
Ω
(un ◦ f)dπn −
∫
Ω
(u ◦ f)dπ|
≤ |
∫
Ω
(un ◦ f − u ◦ f)dπn|+ |
∫
Ω
(u ◦ f)dπn −
∫
Ω
(u ◦ f)dπ|
<
ǫ
2
+
ǫ
2
= ǫ
Thus E<n converges uniformly to E<.
What still separates us from the desired statement of Proposition 1 after establishing Lemma 4
and Lemma 8 is that Lemma 4 allows negative weights for beliefs and that both lemmas only
apply if beliefs and utility functions are pairwise distinct. The latter is not hard to deal with,
but showing that weights cannot be negative takes more work.
Proposition 1. Let |X| ≥ 4 and Φ be an aggregation function. Then the following are equiva-
lent.
(i) Φ satisfies restricted monotonicity, faithfulness, no belief imposition, and continuity
(ii) There are continuous functions λ,µ : R→ RN++ such that for all I ∈ I and < ∈ R
I , Φ(<)
is represented by 1∑
i∈I λi(<i)
∑
i∈I λi(<i)πi and
∑
i∈I µi(<i)ui
Proof. One can check easily that (ii) implies (i). The rest of the proof will establish that (i)
implies (ii).
Let λ, µ, and for all I ∈ I, σI be the functions obtained from Lemma 4 and Lemma 8.
Step 1. We show that µ is continuous. Let i, j ∈ N and < ∈ R{i,j} such that πi 6= πj and
ui 6= ±uj; let (<i
n) be a sequence in R converging to <i and <
n = (<i
n,<j). By assumption,
Φ is continuous, and by Lemma 9, the mapping from preference relations to the corresponding
utility functions is continuous. Thus, un = ψ(<n) ≡ µi(u
n
i )u
n
i + µj(uj)uj converges to u =
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ψ(<) ≡ µi(ui)ui + µj(uj)uj . First, µi(<i
n) is bounded, as otherwise, a subsequence of (un)
would converge to ui. But this is impossible, since µj(uj) 6= 0 and ui 6= ±uj. Now if α is
an accumulation point of (µi(u
n
i )), then αui + µj(uj)uj ≡ u, since (u
n) converges to u. But
αui +µj(uj)uj ≡ βui + µj(uj)uj if and only if α = β. So (µi(u
n
i )) is bounded and has a unique
accumulation point. Thus, it converges to µi(ui).
Step 2. Let i, j ∈ N and < ∈ R{i,j} such that πi 6= πj, ui 6= ±uj , and Φ(<) is not complete
indifference. We show that σ
{i,j}
i λi is continuous at <. (For convenience, we will omit the
superscript {i, j} from now on.) Let (<n) be a sequence of profiles converging to <. Let
αn = σi(<
n)λi(<i
n) and βn = σj(<
n)λj(<j
n), and α = σi(<)λi(<i) and β = σj(<)λj(<j).
First we prove convergence when j’s preferences remain constant at <j. Let <¯
n
= (<i
n,<j),
α¯n = σi(<¯
n
)λi(<i
n), and β¯n = σj(<¯
n
)λj(<j). We need to show that (α¯
n) converges to α. Note
that β¯n can only vary in sign but not in absolute value. Since Φ and the correspondence mapping
preference relations to the corresponding beliefs are continuous, we have that α¯nπni + β¯
nπj ≡
φ(<¯
n
)→ φ(<) ≡ απi+βπj . With the same reasoning as in Step 1, we get that (α¯
n) is bounded
and has a unique accumulation point. Thus, it converges to α. Similarly, σj(<i,<j
n)λj(<j
n)
converges to β.
Now we show that (αn) converges α. We already know that the sequences of absolute values
of (αn) and (βn) converge to α and β, respectively. So any subsequence (αnk , βnk) such that
all αnk and all βnk have the same sign converges. By the same reasoning as in the previous
paragraph, we conclude that αnkπnki + β
nkπ
nk
j ≡ φ(<
nk) → φ(<) ≡ απi + βπj . Since πi 6= πj,
this implies that (αnk , βnk) converges to (α, β). Thus (αn, βn) converges to (α, β).
Step 3. Now we deduce that σi is always equal to 1. Assume for contradiction that there is
a profile <˜ ∈ R{i,j} such that π˜i 6= π˜j, u˜i 6= ±u˜j, Φ(<˜) is not complete indifference, and
σi(<˜) = −1. Since σiλi and σjλj are continuous at <˜ by Step 2, we can find a neighborhood
of <˜ such that σi(<) = −1 for all profiles < contained in it. In particular, we can find ǫ > 0
such that σi(<) = −1 whenever <i = <˜i, uj = u˜j, and sup{|πj(E) − π˜j(E)| : E ∈ Σ} < ǫ. Let
P˜ be this set of profiles. By Liapounoff’s (1940) theorem, we can find an event E such that
π˜i(E) = π˜j(E) =
ǫ
2 . But then P˜ contains a profile < such that σi(<) = −1, πi(E) = π˜i(E) =
ǫ
2
and πj(E) = 0. This is not possible, since σi(<)λi(<i)πi(E) + σj(<)λj(<j)πj(E) would be
negative.
Since j was arbitrary and σI satisfies the restriction on the ratio of σIi and σ
I
j stated in
Lemma 4, it follows that σIi is constant at 1 for all I. Since we have shown that σiλi is
continuous, so is λi.
(Alternatively, one could show that the set of profiles where beliefs and utility functions are
pairwise distinct and Φ is not complete indifference is connected. Then the fact that σiλi is
continuous and never 0 implies that it cannot change sign.)
Step 4. Let Φ¯ be the aggregation function where Φ¯(<) is represented by φ¯(<) ≡
∑
i∈I λi(<i)πi
and ψ¯(<) ≡
∑
i∈I µi(<i)ui for every profile < with agents in I ∈ I. We know that Φ and Φ¯
agree on all profiles for which beliefs and utility functions are pairwise distinct. These profiles
are dense in RI for all I. Our task is to show that they agree on an arbitrary profile < ∈ RI .
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Case 1. Suppose neither Φ(<) nor Φ¯(<) is complete indifference. By Lemma 9, Step 1, and
Step 2, φ,ψ, φ¯, and ψ¯ are continuous at <. Moreover, the pairs φ and φ¯ and ψ and ψ¯ agree on
a set of profiles with < in its closure. Thus, φ(<) = φ¯(<) and ψ(<) = ψ¯(<). It follows that
Φ(<) = Φ¯(<).
Case 2. Suppose that Φ(<) is complete indifference. (The proof is analogous if Φ¯(<) is complete
indifference.) Let i ∈ N − I with preferences <i such that ui 6= ±ψ¯(<). Then for <+i =
(<,<i), by Lemma 5, ψ(<+i) = ui and ψ¯(<+i) ≡ ψ¯(<) + αui for some α > 0. In particular,
ψ(<+i), ψ¯(<+i) 6= 0. Thus Case 1 implies that ψ(<+i) = ψ¯(<+i). Since ui 6= ±ψ¯(<), this can
only be if ψ¯(<) = 0, and hence Φ¯(<) is complete indifference.
C. Implications of Independence of Redundant Acts
Using independence of redundant acts, we derive a lemma which, together with Proposition 1,
concludes the proof of Theorem 1. But first we need an auxiliary statement. Recall that a
function is simple if it has finite range.
Lemma 10. Let I ∈ I and i ∈ I; let < ∈ RI such that uj is simple for j ∈ I − {i}. Then for
every act f , there is a simple act g such that f ∼j g for all j ∈ I.
Proof. Put differently, we want to show that for every act f , there is a simple act g such that
(E<j(f))j∈I = (E<j(g))j∈I .
We first show that the sets X+ = {x ∈ X : ui(x) ≥ E<i(f)} and X
− = {x ∈ X : ui(x) ≤
E<i(f)} are non-empty. If X
+ is empty, then Ω =
⋃
k∈N{s ∈ Ω: ui(f(s)) ≤ E<i(f) −
1
k
}.
Note that all sets in this union are measurable. Since πi is countably additive, there is k0 such
that πi({s ∈ Ω: ui(f(s)) ≤ E<i(f) −
1
k0
}) = ǫ > 0. The fact that X+ is empty then gives
E<i(f) ≤ E<i(f)−
ǫ
k0
, which is a contradiction. Similarly, one shows that X− is non-empty.
Now let V = {u−i(x) : x ∈ X} ⊂ R
I−{i} be the range of u−i. Since all uj are simple, V is
finite. We partition the set of consequences X into the measurable sets Xv = u
−1
−i (v) and the set
of states Ω into the measurable sets Ev = f
−1(Xv) with v ranging over V . To define g, consider
two cases. If πi(Ev) = 0, choose xv ∈ Xv arbitrarily and let g(s) = xv for all s ∈ Ev. If πi(Ev) >
0, then 1
πi(Ev)
πi|Ev is a probability measure on Ev, where πi|Ev is πi restricted to events contained
in Ev. By the previous paragraph, the sets X
+
v = {x ∈ Xv : ui(x) ≥
1
πi(Ev)
∫
Ev
(ui ◦ f)d(πi|Ev)}
andX−v = {x ∈ Xv : ui(x) ≤
1
πi(Ev)
∫
Ev
(ui◦f)d(πi|Ev)} are non-empty. Thus, there are x
+ ∈ X+v
and x− ∈ X−v and α ∈ [0, 1] such that αui(x
+) + (1 − α)ui(x
−) = 1
πi(Ev)
∫
Ev
(ui ◦ f)d(πi|Ev).
Since πi is non-atomic, there is E
+
v ⊂ Ev such that πi(E
+
v ) = απi(Ev). We define g(s) = x
+ for
s ∈ E+v and g(s) = x
− for s ∈ Ev − E
+
v . This gives∫
Ev
(ui ◦ f)d(πi|Ev) = πi(Ev)(αui(x
+) + (1− α)ui(x
−)
= πi(E
+
v )ui(x
+) + πi(Ev − E
+
v )ui(x
−) =
∫
Ev
(ui ◦ g)d(πi|Ev)
Also, since u−i is constant on Xv,
∫
Ev
(uj ◦ f)d(πj |Ev) =
∫
Ev
(uj ◦ g)d(πj |Ev) for all j ∈ I − {i}.
In summary, we have (E<j(f))j∈I = (E<j(g))j∈I .
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Lemma 11. Let λ,µ : R → RN++ be continuous functions; let Φ be an aggregation function
such that for every I ∈ I and < ∈ RI , Φ(<) is represented by 1∑
i∈I λi(<i)
∑
i∈I λi(<i)πi and∑
i∈I µi(<i)ui. Then if Φ satisfies independence of redundant acts, λ and µ are constant.
Proof. Let i, j ∈ N and <i,<i
′ ∈ R. We want to show that λi(<i) = λi(<i
′) and µi(<i) =
µi(<i
′). In the first step, we show that λi and µi are independent of πi. In the rest of the proof,
we show that they are independent of ui, too.
Step 1. Assume that ui = u
′
i. First we show λi(<i) = λi(<i
′). Let Λ = {E ∈ Σ: πi(E) = π
′
i(E)}.
We construct a suitable belief for agent j. Let E ∈ Λ such that πi(E) =
1
2 . If πi = π
′
i, there
is nothing to show. Otherwise, either πi|E 6= π
′
i|E or πi|Ω−E 6= π
′
i|Ω−E. Assume the former is
true. Then define πj so that πj(F ) = 2πi(F ) for every F ⊂ E and πj(Ω − E) = 0. Moreover,
choose uj ∈ U so that uj is simple and uj 6= ±ui and let <j be represented by πj and uj .
The set of acts to which we will apply independence of redundant acts is G = {g ∈
F : g is simple and g−1(x) ∈ Λ for every x ∈ X}. To meet the antecedent of independence
of redundant acts, we have to show that for every f ∈ F , there is g ∈ G such that f ∼i g and
f ∼j g. (The choice of G and ui = u
′
i ensure that also f ∼
′
i g.)
By Lemma 10, we may assume that f is simple. Define g as follows: let f(Ω) = {x1, . . . , xk}
be the range of f . For every xl, let αl = πi(E ∩ f
−1(xl)) and α
c
l = πi((Ω − E) ∩ f
−1(xl)).
(Note that πj(E ∩ f
−1(xl)) = 2αl.) Liapounoff’s theorem allows us to find events El ⊂ E and
Ecl ⊂ Ω−E in Λ such that πi(El) = αl and πi(E
c
l ) = α
c
l . In fact, we can partition E and Ω−E
into {E1, . . . , Ek} and {E
c
1, . . . , E
c
k}, respectively. Then let g(s) = xl for s ∈ El ∪ E
c
l . One can
check that πj(El ∪ E
c
l ) = 2πi(El) = 2αl. Thus, E<i(f) = E<i(g) and E<j (f) = E<j(g) and so
f ∼i g and f ∼j g.
Let < = f(<i,<j) and <
′ = f(<i
′,<j) and π, u, π
′, u′ be the corresponding beliefs and utility
functions. Independence of redundant acts applied to the profiles (<i,<j) and (<i
′,<j) gives
g < g′ if and only if g <′ g′ for all g, g′ ∈ G.
Assume that λi(<i) 6= λi(<i
′). First, since uj 6= ±ui and u ≡ λi(ui)ui + λj(uj)uj , < cannot
be complete indifference, and so we can find consequences x and y such that x ≻ y. Recall that
πi(E) = π
′
i(E) =
1
2 and πj(E) = 1. It follows that π(E) 6= π
′(E) and π(E), π′(E) > 12 . So there
is an event E′ ⊂ E such that E′ ∈ Λ, π(E′) 6= 12 , and π
′(E′) = 12 . Thus, xE
′y and yE′x are acts
in G but xE′y 6∼ yE′x and xE′y ∼′ yE′x. This contradicts independence of redundant acts and
so λi(<i) = λi(<i
′).
Second, assume that µi(<i) 6= µi(<i
′). Since uj 6= ±ui, it follows that u 6= u
′ and we can a find
simple lotteries p and q on X such that u(p) > u(q) but u′(q) ≥ u′(p). Since λi(<i) = λi(<i
′)
by the previous paragraph, π(F ) = π′(F ) if and only if F ∈ Λ. So by Liapounoff’s theorem, we
can find acts g and g′ in G with g ◦ π = p and g′ ◦ π′ = q. This gives g ≻ g′ but g′ <′ g, which
contradicts independence of redundant acts. We conclude that µi(<i) = µi(<i
′).
Step 2. By Step 1, we can view λi and µi as functions λi(ui) and µi(ui) of ui. We show that
both these functions are constant.
Recall that U consists of utility functions which are normalized to the unit interval, that
is, infx u(x) = 0 and supx u(x) = 1. Let U
′ = {u ∈ U : there exist x, y ∈ X with u(x) =
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0 1
ui0
1
uj
u(x0)
u(x1)
u(x∗)u(y2)
u(y1)
u(y3)
0 1
u′′i0
1
uj
u′′(x0)
u′′(x1)
u′′(x∗) = u′′(y1)
u′′(y2)
u′′(y3)
Figure 1: The images of u = (ui, uj) and u
′′ = (u′′i , uj) in utility space. For example, u(x0) =
(ui(x0), uj(x0)) = (0, 0). The consequences y1, y2, and y3 are examples for the three
cases in the definition of u′′i .
0 and u(y) = 1} be those utility functions for which the infimum and the supremum are attained.
Observe that the closure of U ′ is U . Thus, since λi and µi are continuous, it suffices to show
that they are constant on U ′. This we do now.
Let ui ∈ U
′; let x0, x1 ∈ X such that ui(x0) = 0 and ui(x1) = 1 and x
∗ ∈ X − {x0, x1} be
arbitrary; let u′i be such that u
′
i(x) = ui(x) for x ∈ {x0, x1, x
∗}. We show that λi(ui) = λi(u
′
i)
and µi(ui) = µi(u
′
i). Since |X| ≥ 4, repeated application of this statement gives the same
conclusion for all u′i ∈ U
′.
Let u′′i be such that
u′′i (x) =


ui(x
∗) if ui(x) < ui(x
∗) and u′i(x) > ui(x
∗)
u′i(x) if ui(x) < ui(x
∗) and u′i(x) ≤ ui(x
∗)
ui(x) if ui(x) ≥ ui(x
∗)
Note that u′′i (x) = u
′
i(x) = ui(x) for x ∈ {x0, x1, x
∗}. We want to apply independence of
redundant acts to profiles with utility functions (ui, uj) and (u
′′
i , uj) and the set of acts G =
{f ∈ F : f(Ω) ⊂ {x0, x1, x
∗}}. This requires choosing uj appropriately. Let uj be such that
uj(x) =


0 if ui(x) ≤ ui(x
∗)
ui(x) otherwise
Figure 1 depicts the images of (ui, uj) and (u
′′
i , uj) in utility space. From ui to u
′′
i , we adjust
the utility for consequences with ui(x) ≤ ui(x
∗) toward u′i(x) without raising it above ui(x
∗).
Setting uj as we did, we can now apply independence of redundant acts to the corresponding
profiles.
Let πi, πj ∈ Π with πi 6= πj and <i,<i
′′, and <j be represented by the pairs (πi, ui), (πi, u
′′
i ),
and (πj, uj), respectively. First, since ui(x) = u
′′
i (x) for x ∈ {x0, x1, x
∗}, it is clear that
< = (<i,<j) and <
′′ = (<i
′′,<j) agree on the preferences over acts in G. Second, since u(x)
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is in the convex hull of {u(x0),u(x1),u(x
∗)} for all x ∈ X, we have that for every act f ∈ F ,
there is an act g ∈ G such that f ∼i g and f ∼j g. The analogous assertion holds for <i
′′ and
<j. It follows from independence of redundant acts that with < = Φ(<) and <
′′ = Φ(<′′), we
have for all g, g′ ∈ G, g < g′ if and only if g <′′ g′. Let (π, u) and (π′′, u′′) be the beliefs and
utility functions associated with < and <′′, respectively. Note that u(x0) = u
′′(x0) = 0 and
u(x1) = u
′′(x1) = 1.
If λi(ui) 6= λi(u
′′
i ), then π 6= π
′′ since πi 6= πj . So we can find an event E such that π(E) =
1
2 6= π
′′(E). It follows that x0Ex1 ∼ x1Ex0 but x0Ex1 6∼
′′ x1Ex0, which is a contradiction since
both acts are in G.
If µi(ui) 6= µi(u
′′
i ), then u(x
∗) 6= u′′(x∗), since ui(x
∗) = u′′i (x
∗) 6= uj(x
∗). Let E be an
event such that π(E) = π′′(E) = u(x∗). Then x∗ ∼ x1Ex0 but x
∗ 6∼ x1Ex0, which is again a
contradiction.
We conclude that λi(ui) = λi(u
′′
i ) and µi(ui) = µi(u
′′
i ). The function u
′′
i is closer to u
′
i than is
ui, since we have constructed it by moving utilities toward those in u
′
i. Two more modifications
of agent 1’s utility function along the same lines will result in u′i. To this end, we apply the
same construction first to the profiles with utility functions (u′′i , u
′
j) and (u
′′′
i , u
′
j) and then to
profiles with utility functions (u′′′i , uj) and (u
′
i, uj) (and the same beliefs πi and πj).
u′′′i (x) =


u′′i (x
∗) if u′′i (x) ≥ u
′′
i (x
∗) and u′i(x) < u
′′
i (x
∗)
u′i(x) if u
′′
i (x) ≥ u
′′
i (x
∗) and u′i(x) ≥ u
′′
i (x
∗)
u′′i (x) if u
′′
i (x) < u
′′
i (x
∗)
u′j(x) =


1 if u′′i (x) ≥ u
′′
i (x
∗)
u′′i (x) otherwise
In summary, this gives λi(ui) = λi(u
′
i) and µi(ui) = µi(u
′
i) and proves the lemma.
Theorem 1 now follows from Proposition 1 and Lemma 11.
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